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This study aims to examine the determinants of accounting-based performance of 531 non-financial 
Malaysian listed companies over the period 2004 to2012. System generalized method of moments reveals 
that both prior risk-taking behaviour and size are found to be important determinants of performance. A 
significant positive influence of prior risk-taking behaviour on performance implies that risk-averse 
managers are cognitively influenced by their capability in handling risky investments in the past; 
consequently enhance confidence in their ability to manage profitable investments. The result appears to 
support the capital asset pricing model implication. Meanwhile, a significant positive size-performance 
relationship suggests that investors and fund managers should focus on larger companies as they can 
have better stock performance. 
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Introduction 
Financial performance is considered as an effective indicator of company’s achievement over its fiscal 
year. Return on asset (ROA) is one of the most favorable accounting-based performance measures (Al-
Matari, Al-Swidi & Fadzil, 2014; Issah & Antwi, 2017), which reflects the fundamentals of business, 
including the effectiveness of wealth-generating activities by means of assets utilization. In view of this 
fact, ROA could be considered as one of the essential components of financial performance measures 
which can encourage people to invest in a company. As such, corporate managers should take strategic 
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actions to genuinely improve this accounting-based performance from time to time.  
 
The issue on determinants of corporate financial performance has long been discussed in the areas of 
financial economics (Hodoshima, Garza-Gomez, & Kunimura, 2000; Blitz & Van Vliet, 2007; Rossi & 
Timmerman, 2012; Vintila & Nenu, 2015) and strategic management (McNamara & Bromiley, 1999; 
Andersen, Denrell, & Bettis, 2007; Henkel, 2009; Li, Yang & Zhang, 2014). Identification of factors that 
can accurately predict firm performance is of great interest to any decision maker. Many studies 
(Hawawini, Subramanian, & Verdin, 2003; Issah & Antwi, 2017) argue that industry-specific (external) 
factors play a more important role in dictating the influence of firm performance. On the other hand, other 
studies (Opler & Titman, 1994; Kamasak, 2011) suggest that firm specific (internal) factors seem to be 
the major determinants of firm performance, and are the main driver of competitive advantage which is 
crucial for long-run survival of a company. Focusing on firm specific factors seems more appropriate for 
this study since prior research documented that firm characteristics factors had a greater effect in 




Several research papers (Chandrapala & Knápková, 2013; Kaya, 2015; Ismail & Subramaniam, 2017) 
developed a measurement model for firm performance based on various internal indicators. Chandrapala 
and Knápková (2013) investigate the impact of eight internal factors on ROA of 974 firms in the Czech 
Republic over the period 2005 to 2008. The study shows that firm size, sales growth and capital turnover 
are having significant positive impact on financial performance of firms. Meanwhile, debt ratio and 
inventory reflect significant negative impact on financial performance of firms. Furthermore, Kaya (2015) 
investigates the firm-specific factors affecting the profitability of 24 non-life insurance companies 
operating in Turkey over the period 2006 to 2013. The main results of the study demonstrate that 
profitability of non-life insurance companies is statistically significant and positively related to the size of 
a company and premium growth rate, whereas profitability is statistically significant and negatively 
related to the age of a company, loss ratio, and current ratio. A similar study was conducted by Ismail and 
Subramaniam (2017) on 42 consumer products companies in Malaysia for the period 2006 to2015. The 
results suggest that sales growth (debt to equity ratio) is positively (negatively) and significantly related to 
profitability.  
 
However, despite being a highly debated topic in the literature, previous studies have not reached a 
conclusive inference with regard to which company-specific factors most affect the performance of a 
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company. Inconclusive results will impinge investors' strategy to secure the best investment opportunities 
with maximum returns for a given level of risks. Therefore, it provides an avenue for the current research 
to test the previously examined factors and integrate behavioural models of decision making, agency 
theory and other relevant theoretical views into the research framework. A blend of a broader set of 
organisational theories could give a better explanation on risk-return relationship, which can add value to 
the body of knowledge on this issue in the context of emerging markets.  
 
The Malaysian stock market is of special interest as Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) views 
it as one of the emerging markets in the Asian region which could offer a good place for investment1 
(Lingaraja, Selvam & Vasanth, 2014). Even though comparatively an emerging market such as Malaysia 
is claimed to be efficient during the period of 2004 to 2013 among the Asian region  (Lingaraja et al., 
2014), the profile of risk and return in this market may be different from those of efficient markets in 
developed countries. This is because emerging markets and developed markets do not have similar 
characteristics (Bekaert, Erb, Harvey & Viskanta, 1998; Bekaert & Harvey, 2002; Bekaert & Harvey, 
2003). 
 
This study focuses on both the lagged and contemporaneous risk-taking, size, financial slack and leverage 
as company-specific factors that are expected to have influence on accounting-based performance. To the 
author’s knowledge, this is the first attempt to utilize generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
in investigating the determinants of corporate performance within the context of the Malaysian market. 
By using system generalized method of moments (S-GMM) which is claimed as robust in the class of all 
GMM estimators, this paper could offer a better explanation on the issue discussed.  
 
Conventionally, decision makers are assumed to be prone to risk-averse behaviour (Jensen, 1986; Coffee, 
1988; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Apparently, this behaviour will lead to positive risk-return 
relationships (Fisher & Hall, 1969; Hurdle, 1974; Brealey & Myers, 2003). This risk preference is 
deemed to be compatible in the settings of an efficient market wherein assets are priced with the aim that 
their expected return will compensate shareholders for their expected risk. However, the empirical issue 
of Bowman’s paradox which has been widely discussed in the Western countries since Bowman’s (1980) 
seminal work denies the standard assumption of a positive risk-return relationship and risk-averse 
behaviour derived from the CAPM theory.  
 
                                                          
1 By having sound domestic macroeconomic fundamentals, ample liquidity of financial markets and good banking 
systems enable Malaysia to have sufficient buffers against external shocks, namely, USA sub-prime financial crisis 
and European sovereign debt crisis (Abidin & Rasiah, 2009; Ibrahim, 2010; Samsi, Yusof & Cheong, 2012). 
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Many management scholars empirically prove risk-seeking behaviour amongst manager leads to negative 
risk-return relationship (Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1985, 1986, 1988; Wiseman & 
Bromiley, 1991). This phenomenon emerges as the management team of a poorly performed company is 
willing to bear higher risks, and do not mind to accept lower returns as long as the company has an 
opportunity to get out from an unfavourable situation. The temptation to engage in risk-seeking behaviour 
reflects the perspective of Tversky (1990) irrational behaviour of organisational decision makers in 
making investment decision. Behavioural finance suggests that the decision makers' risk preference is 
affected by several cognitive and psychological errors (Ritter, 2003). Apparently, anomaly in risk 
preference contradicts the core assumption of efficient market hypothesis (EMH). The paradox in 
accounting-based risk-return relationship remains unexplained as Oviatt and Bauerschmidt (1991) fail to 
detect any significant relationship between risk and return based on three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimates. In addition, Chang and Thomas (1989) document both positive (managers tend to pursue risky 
investments as they experience certain level of higher returns) and negative relationship (managers also 
tend to gamble on risky investments as they experience certain level of lower returns) or a curvilinear 
risk-return relationship. 
 
The observation of inverse relationship between size of companies and performance, which is labelled as 
size effect is first documented by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981). Based on the US market data, they 
suggest that excess returns would have been earned by holding stocks of small size companies. The 
finding on this issue is further supported by Fama and French (1992). Amel-Zadeh (2011) validates the 
existence of size effect in the Germany equity market. He suggests that the impact of company size on 
stock returns is conditional on market situation where in the bearish (bullish) market, smaller (larger) 
companies outperform larger (smaller) companies. 
 
However, the evidence on the issue of size effect has not always been one-sided.  For example, studies 
based on data from the US (Chang & Thomas, 1989; Horowitz, Loughran & Savin, 2000; Schwert, 2003; 
Chaibi, Alioui & Xiao, 2014), Korea (Mukherji, Dhatt & Kim, 1997), UK (Dimson & Marsh, 1999; 
Dimson, Marsh & Staunton, 2002), Nigeria (Muritala, 2012), Tanzania (Kipesha, 2013), Czech Republic 
(Chandrapala & Knápková, 2013); Turkey (Kaya (2015)  and Malaysia (Mohd Ali, 2006) suggest that 
small size companies have substantially lower returns than large size companies. These researches show 
that the reversed size effect is not only happen in emerging markets but also exist in mature markets. 
Schwert (2003) suggests that the size effect appears to be reversed because practitioners begin to utilize 
investment tools which enable them to exploit the small-firm anomaly for their portfolio maximisation. 
Some studies have shown that large firms have a direct impact on performance due to the ability in 
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operating business efficiently (Kumar, 2004; Bos & Kolari; 2005; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Aljifri & 
Moustafa, 2007), utilizing economies of scales and dominating the market (Bain, 1954; Kumar, 2004; 
Serrasqueiro & Macas Nunes, 2008), experiencing more business diversification (Yang & Chen, 2009), 
having greater financial resources (Arora & Gambardella, 1990), and diversifying risk efficiently (Ghosh, 
1998; Bossone & Lee, 2004). 
The issue on financial slack-performance relationship in the developed markets has been investigated 
from the perspective of behavioural theory of the firm and agency theory. The proponents of behavioural 
theory of the firm and agency theory posit contradictory hypothesis on the influence of financial slack on 
firm's performance (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari & Turner, 2004). From the perspective of behavioural 
theory of the firm, financial slack is excess resource that can be utilized to absorb variation in external 
business environment and tackle problems that may threaten company's survival (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase 
& Tansik, 1988). In addition, financial slack resource can be used to take advantage of environmental 
opportunities and pursue innovative activities (Cyert & March, 1963; Sang, Hyuksoo & Hinh, 2014). 
Therefore, organisational decision makers need to be proactive in order to facilitate environmental change 
(Cheng & Kesner, 1997). These arguments support the positive effect of financial slack on performance 
of a company (Cyert & March, 1963; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Marlin & Geiger, 2015). In line with this 
contention, many researchers argue that financial slack is necessary to ensure the long-run survival of a 
company (Singh, 1986; Hambrick & D'Aaveni, 1988; Lee, 2011).  
 
In contrast, from the perspective of corporate governance issue, agency theorists typically argue that 
without effective monitoring of management, financial slack provides extra costs and inefficiency to the 
company and thus harm its performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1986). This is 
because organisational decision makers who are described as self-centred agents would have a tendency 
to waste the extra financial resources for the purpose of seeking their own interest at the expense of 
shareholders. Therefore, many scholars are in agreement that financial slack should be reduced to 
minimize the possibility of mismanagement which can cause performance to decline (Davis & Stout, 
1992; Phan & Hill, 1995; Steensma & Corley, 2000).  
 
A number of previous literature have shown that corporate governance mechanisms are important to be 
implemented in order to promote a more transparent and effective decision making criteria for the 
management to act in the best interest of the shareholders (Tirole, 2001; Al-Faki, 2006). In the context of 
Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, leverage is considered as one of the governance mechanisms 
which can reduce the opportunistic behaviour of managers in over-investing the financial resources under 
their control at the expense of shareholders. The proponents of free cash flow hypothesis argue that by 
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having greater debt financing leads managers to put more efforts in managing risky projects that have 
greater potential for larger returns. Failure to meet debt payment will expose the company to bankruptcy 
problems (Altman, 1993), which in turn may cause the threat of manager’s replacement (Jensen, 1989). 
Thus, the existence of such governance mechanism would mitigate the manager-shareholder conflict of 
interest which in turn could improve shareholders’ value (Jensen, 1986; Harris & Raviv, 1991). The 
evidence of free cash flow hypothesis is further supported by a number of researchers (see for example, 
Campello, 2006; Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Franck, Huyghebaert & D'Espallier, 2010). 
 
The organisation of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes how the present study is 
practically carried out. In Section 3, the results of the study are presented. Finally, Section 4 summarises 
the findings and highlights the implications of the study.  
 
Methods 
The empirical test of this study is based on 531 non-financial Malaysian listed companies. An unbalanced 
panel data is collected for nine years from 2004 to 2012. The period of study was selected because the 
Malaysian stock market was claimed as relatively efficient as compared to its counterparts in the Asian 
region during those period (Lingaraja, Selvam & Vasanth, 2014). All annual based data set for this study 
are extracted from Datastream. The purpose of relying on a single source of database is to ensure 
consistency of extracted data. The uniformity of the data is expected to result in an unbiased analysis. To 
answer the research objective of this study, the following model is examined. 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛼𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
+ 𝛼𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
Where, i = 1,…, N represents the company and t = 1,…, T represents time period. Dependent variable,
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents company i’s performance. The company-specific variables namely, 
 RISKSTDroai,t-1 and RISKSTDroai,t represent risk-taking
2 in year t -1 and t respectively;  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 refers 
to company i’s size (measured by total assets) in year t;  FSlacki,t is financial slack (measured by current 
ratio) for company i in year t; and  LEVi,t  is company i’s debt-to-equity ratio in year t. Time dummies are 
                                                          
2 Risk is measured by using standard deviation (STD) which is a traditional and the most popularly used measure of 
risk introduced by Markowitz (1952, 1959). In this particular study, risk is calculated by taking the standard 
deviation of ROA (Shehzad, 2009; Lu, 2011; Mihet, 2013; Li, Tripe, & Malone, 2016).  There are other measures 
of risk used by previous studies such as risk-tolerance ratio (Walls & Dyer, 1996; Walls, 2005), value at risk 
(Linsmeier & Pearson, 1996; Corkalo, 2011) and below mean semi-deviation (Estrada, 2000; Beach, 2011; Allen 




included in the specification (where appropriate) and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is transformed into logarithms. It is assumed 
that the error terms 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 in the above equation follow a one-way error component model: 
 
 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 +  𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
       
Where 𝜆𝜆 i~iid (0,σ2𝜆𝜆) represents the specific effects and 𝛎𝛎it ~iid (0,σ2𝛎𝛎) is the error term. They are 
independent of each other and among themselves. 
 
This research applies one of the most common variations of GMM to estimate the dynamic unbalanced 
panel models. The method is known as system-GMM (S-GMM) estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Blundell & Bond, 1998; 2000). This dynamic panel data estimation approach is an extension of the 
original GMM estimator from Arellano and Bond (1991), which is known as difference-GMM (D-GMM) 
estimator. The basic principle of the D-GMM is to eliminate the unobserved individual-specific effects by 
accomplishing first-differenced equations with suitable lagged levels of the dependent and endogenous 
variables as instruments. However, implementing first differencing lessens the variation in all regressors 
which leads to weak identification problem and increases the measurement errors. Therefore, the S-GMM 
is employed. 
 
The S-GMM method combines moment conditions for model in first differences (the transformed 
equation) with moment conditions for the model in levels (the original equation). This process is done by 
exploiting lagged variables at levels as instrumental variables in the transformed equation whereas lagged 
difference variables are used as instruments in the original equation. By estimating regressions in the 
transformed and original equations simultaneously, the S-GMM is able to differentiate the instruments 
while keeping regressors in levels. Hence, this procedure allows the introduction of more instruments, 
further reduce the finite sample bias and substantially improve the estimation efficiency (Blundell, Bond 
& Windmeijer, 2000; Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). The consistency and reliability 
of GMM estimator procedures are tested using two standard diagnostic tests. The over-identifying 
restriction is tested using the Sargan’s (1964) test of misspecification.  Meanwhile the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) tests for first order serial correlation (AR(1)) and second order serial correlation (AR(2)) of the 
residuals are applied to verify the efficiency of model estimations using GMM approach. 
 
S-GMM estimation procedure is performed in one- and two-step variants. The process starts by 
calculating the one-step GMM estimates. In the first step, homoskedasticity and independent residuals are 
assumed. Then, by utilizing the one-step residuals, a more efficient two-step GMM estimator is 
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computed. The two-step S-GMM estimation method is credited as more sophisticated and effective 
approach since this estimator uses optimal weighting matrices. Furthermore, Windmeijer (2005) proposes 
a two-step estimator with robust standard errors to correct finite-sample bias. The adjustment is 
performed by acquiring an estimated variance covariance matrix (VCE) which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity. This adjustment will not change the point estimates. Only estimated VCE and standard 
errors are changed. By doing the correction of the standard errors of the two-step GMM estimates, this 
estimator is more competent in dealing with the issues of endogeneity for some of the explanatory 
variables and omitted variables bias. Most importantly, this method is capable of offering acceptable and 
consistent estimators under the above mentioned issues. 
 
Results 
Table 1 presents the summary of descriptive statistics for each continuous variable used in the study over 
the period 2004 to 2012. The number of observations depicted in Table 1 depends on the availability of 
the data provided by Datastream. Thus, the total number of observations for company specific 
characteristics is not equal to 4779 company-year observations.  The findings of descriptive analysis 
represent both the 388 active companies and 143 delisted companies categorized under all non-financial 
sectors. This has caused a huge gap between the minimum and maximum value of all variables. The blend 







Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables over the Period 2004-2012 
 
 Obs (N) Mean STD Min Max 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (%) 4109 3.33 12.36 -99.90 107.70 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (%) 3726 3.24 12.58 -104.28 111.95 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (%) 3711 5.64 7.49 0.20 58.51 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (%) 3335 5.73 7.60 0.20 59.35 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 3(Total Assets in RM’000) 4134 1195697   2311269 1172 11100000 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (%) 4074 2.42 2.49 0.01 12.43 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  4128 0.67 1.79    -11.41 12.91 
 
 
The results of pairwise Pearson’s correlation for the research model are depicted in Table 2. Generally, 
there is almost no multicollinearity problem arise between the independent variables in the predictive 
model. This is because the pairwise Pearson’s correlation indicators for almost all independent variables 
are less than 0.8. Table 2 shows that only 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 41T has a pairwise Pearson’s correlation that 
exceed 0.8. Therefore, to ensure there is no multicollinearity problem amongst the paired variables, 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is applied. Hair et al. (2010) suggested that a VIF of less than 10 would 
indicate no serious multicollinearity problem exists. The results in Table 3 confirms that there is no threat 









                                                          
3 The descriptive statistic of SIZE is purposely stated as integer values in Table 1 so as to reflect the actual size of 














     
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃  0.87**   1.00     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 -0.23** -0.26** 1.00    
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 -0.04* -0.05** -0.07** 1.00   
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 -0.07** -0.07** 0.13** -0.17** 1.00  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.18** -0.15** 0.22** 0.14** 0.003 1.00 




Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for Multicollinearity Assumption of Model  
 
Independent variables VIF 






Since financial econometric issue discussed in this study is dynamic by nature, dynamic panel data 
analysis by using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is applied. The standard diagnostic 
tests of dynamic System-GMM (S-GMM) estimator presented in Table 4 reveals that the research model 



























𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛼𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛼𝛼5𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
Sargan test of over-










2nd  order autocorrelation 
Test (p-value) 
- 1.23  (0.22) 1.18  (0.24) 1.35  (0.18) 
# of lags - - - 5 
# of Instruments 41 41 41 46 
# of Groups 500 500 500 500 
 
 
In line with Arellano and Bond (1991) findings, column (1) of Table 4 shows that the one-step S-GMM 
version of Sargan-test is sensitive to heteroskedasticity (p-value is less than 0.05), leading to rejection of 
the validity of instruments for the model. Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form, the 
results of repeated Sargan-test analysis based on two-step GMM (column 2), two-step GMM estimators 
with robust standard error (column 3), and two-step S-GMM with time dummies which includes p lags of 
dependent variable (column 4) are then presented. Result shows that the two-step S-GMM with time 
dummies and p lags of dependent variable is regarded as the final estimator. This is because the higher p-
value of the Sargan statistic (p-value is greater than 0.05) reflects that the instruments are exogenous and 
the model is appropriate. Therefore, the result suggests that this model is well specified and the estimators 
chosen are consistent. 
12 
 
 Another important diagnostic test in dynamic panel data estimation is the Arellano-Bond (1991) test for 
autocorrelation between residuals (AR). This diagnostic test is employed to check on the validity of 
instruments due to the dynamic nature of data (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Overall, results of the diagnostic 
test AR(2) reported in Table 4 meet the requirements of accepting no second order serial correlation in the 
first-difference residuals (all respective p-values are greater than 0.05).  
 
Table 5 documents that lagged corporate risk-taking (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) has a positive and significant 
influence on contemporaneous accounting performance. The coefficient of regressing 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 on 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  is 0.47 (z = 3.50) and it is significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The estimated 
coefficient implies that a one percentage point increase in 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 tends to increase the 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 by 0.47 percentage point. The relationship between these two variables is commonly 
discussed in industrial organisation economics and strategic management. The results imply that 
corporate decision makers in Malaysia engage in risk-averse behaviour when they expect this behaviour 
brings in higher returns. In line with the risk-averse preference, managers are sensitive to the past 
accounting-based risk taking indicators as a basis for matching their response towards securing a safer 
investment (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Consequently, high accounting returns are expected in order 
to compensate for taking additional risk in the past. The above argument explains the existence of a 
significantly positive correlation between prior risk-taking and subsequent performance in the Malaysian 
listed companies. The finding confirms that the effect of risk on returns is not immediate but gradually 




The Impact of Company-Specific Factors on Accounting-Based Performance 
 
Corporate Performance Indicator                                                      𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 
Constant -84.84 (-5.44)*** 
Lagged Corporate Risk-taking (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)     0.47 (3.50)*** 
Contemporaneous Corporate Risk-taking (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)  -0.28 (-1.82)* 
Total Assets  (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 6.48  (5.48)*** 
Current Ratio (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 0.48  (1.90)* 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio (𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) 0.002 (0.70) 
Lagged Dependent Variable (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) 0.21 (9.90)*** 
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Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) Pass 
2nd  order autocorrelation Test (p-value) Pass 
Company-year observation 3141 
T        9 
Notes: (1) Only the final models are reported; (2) The lagged dependent variable used as explanatory 
variables in this model is positive and has a highly significant effect (at 99% confidence level), 
implying that the model is genuinely dynamic; (3) *** and ** indicate the respective 1% and 5% 
significance level. 
 
The dynamic panel estimation also reveals that the estimated coefficient of company size (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) on 
performance is statistically positive and significant at the 99 percent confidence level, indicating that one 
percentage point increase in  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 would be reflected in 0.0648 percentage point increase in 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. The positive relationship is consistent with the findings of past studies (Chang & Thomas, 
1989; Majumdar, 1997; Mukherji, et al., 1997; Dimson et al., 2002; Schwert, 2003; Mohd Ali, 2006; 
Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Yang & Chen, 2009; Saliha & Abdessatar, 2011; Muritala, 2012; Kipesha, 
2013; Chaibi et al., 2014; Akben-Selcuk, 2016) hence, it verifies the importance of size in influencing 
performance of the Malaysian listed companies. The result also reported that corporate performance is 
negatively (positively) afffected by 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡), but the relationship is only marginally 
significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The former relationship appears to weakly support the 
argument made by previous studies (Bowman, 1980; Bettis & Hall, 1982; Whitelaw, 1994; Ang, et al., 
2006; Banerjee, Doran & Peterson, 2007; Boermans & Willebrands, 2012) that the contemporaneous risk 
has adverse effect on contemporaneous performance. Meanwhile, the latter relationship is consistent to 
the implication stated in the behavioral theory of the firm as promoted by Cyert and March (1963) where 
the greater is the financial slack, the better is the performance of companies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Marlin & Geiger, 2015). However, leverage (𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) is reported to have no influence on corporate 
performance. The insignificant relationship denies the implication stated in the Jensen's (1986) free cash 
flow hypothesis, which maintains that a greater debt financing would reduce the opportunistic behavior of 
managers at the expense of shareholders (Campello, 2006; Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Franck, 










This study investigates factors contributing to accounting-based performance of the Malaysian listed 
companies over the period of 2004 to 2012. The result of multiple regressions using S-GMM estimation 
reveals the existence of a significantly positive correlation between lagged corporate risk-taking and 
performance. This implies that corporate decision makers of the Malaysian listed companies engage in 
risk-averse behaviour when they expect this behaviour leads to higher returns. The preference of a more 
certain outcome to less certain is in line with Sharpe's (1964) CAPM model, but appears to challenge 
Cyert and March’s (1963) behavioral theory of the firm. However, when contemporaneous corporate risk-
taking is considered, minimal negative impact on performance is recorded. This finding inclines to 
support Bowman’s paradox (1980) which suggests that the risk preference amongst Malaysian economic 
agents is not static but vary in accordance with their past experience. The practical implication of the 
finding for managers is that, the role of prior risk-taking should be acknowledged as one of the corporate 
strategies to improve companies’s performance. The dynamic panel estimation also verifies the 
importance of company size as one of the accounting-based corporate performance determinants. This 
would mean that investors and fund managers should focus on large firms as they are associated with 
higher performance. Furthermore, the finding of this research also reports the importance of financial 
slack as one of the contributing factors of corporate performance, but the presence of a positive effect is 
minor. With regard to policy implication to policymakers such as Securities Commission (SC), the 
outcomes could furnish this regulatory body with a more accurate and reliable risk-return assessment 
model. Having a more relevant model can facilitate the regulator in disclosing a more comprehensive and 
relevant risk-return profile of listed companies. Better understanding and perception on the overall risk-
return profile of listed companies is important so that this security market watchdog can regulate a more 
transparent risk-return information disclosure in companies' annual reports. Greater transparency would 
promote trust and confidence as well as protect the interest of investors and other stakeholders. As in 
other studies, there is a limitation to this study where the results are only applicable for the period from 
2004 to 2012. Future research should lengthen the study period taking into account a more recent data set 
so as to capture the profile of risk-return relationship before and after the financial crisis within the past 
two decades of the economic cycle. In addition, we have only used ROA as the performance measure. 
There would be other accounting and market based measures that could represent performance such as 
return on equity and total return index. Future studies could compare which among the measures would 
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